Does EU Funding Improve Local State Capacity? Evidence from Polish Municipalities (2021) (with Jan Vogler), European Union Politics, 22 (3): 446–471.
Winner of the SAGE Award for the Best Article Published in European Union Politics in 2021
Does EU funding affect local state capacity in recipient countries? Local state capacity is an important indicator of self-governance and a key component of democratization processes. In this study, we focus on two specific types of state capacity, namely (1) the ability to provide information to third parties and (2) to discriminate between different kinds of third-party inquiries. Because the European Union's structural funds are distributed through a competitive mechanism and incentivize expansions in administrative personnel, our theory predicts that high levels of EU funding may bring about a higher bureaucratic capacity equilibrium. We assess our theoretical argument by analyzing the effect of EU structural funds on building local government capacity in the largest recipient country, post-communist Poland. Through a randomized survey with more than 2,400 municipal administrations in Poland, we find that local administrations which have benefited more from EU funding, have developed higher levels of discrimination capacity. At the same time, we do not find sufficient evidence for increases in information provision capacity.
From Feudalism to Populism: Evidence from Poland
What explains the support for populism? During early industrialization, the path of industrialization, as reflected in advances in transportation technology, has determined the spatial pattern of urbanization which through path dependence persistently shapes contemporary economic fortunes. I argue that geographies where urbanization was concentrated in fewer and relatively more populous urban centers will be conducive to a high level of inequality in access to economic opportunities, and that resentment over the resulting relative deprivation generates demand for populism. I test my theory empirically by looking at the case of Poland, and using an original dataset find evidence that differences in the extent of the construction of railways between and within Austrian, Russian and German empires pursued in what is now Poland have persistently shaped the distribution of economic fortunes in space and explain the spatial distribution of support for the populist Law and Justice.
Burghers into Peasants: Political Economy of City Status in Congress Poland
Throughout history, European towns were granted a ‘city’ status that transferred political power to burghers and democratized governance, driving urban development. I argue that institutions privileging urban at the expense of landed elites may generate better outcomes even in the absence of democracy and may actually outperform democracy if it leads to political control by landed elites. Using original town-level data, I draw on evidence from an 1869 reform in Congress Poland which deprived three-quarters of the 452 cities of their city status, giving political rights to landed but not urban elites. I show that degraded cities experienced a 64 percentage points slower population growth over the next 40 years. City status was associated with greater public goods provision and more effective judiciary in remaining cities, and contributed to a relative agrarianization of degraded cities. I discuss implications for our understanding of the role of inclusive institutions in promoting development.